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Corporations, both at Coi-mmon Law and under the
Statute, act by and through their
and cannot act otherwise.

trustees and agents,

It is a part of the contract

of subscription of a share-holder that the affairs of the
corporation shall be governed and controlled by its
directors, trustees, or other duly authorized agents.
It has, for this reason, been held to be an implied condition in the formation of every association of a business character,

that the majority of members present at

a share-holders' meeting shall have authority to bind the
whole association by their vote.

Each and every share-

holder contracts that the will of the majority shall govern in all matters coming within the limits of the act
of incorporation.

This rule was laid down by Chief

in DLrfee

Justice Rigelow~vs. the Old Colony R. R. Co. 5 Allen,242
be

"Itmay stated as an indisputable proposi-

as follows :

tion that every person who becomes a member

of a cor-

poration alregate, by purchasing and holding shares,
agreos, by necessary implication, that he v~i]l

be bound

by all acts and proceedings wilhin the scope of the
powers and authority conferred by the charte- which shall
be sanctioned or adopted by a vote of the corporation
duly taken and ascertained acoording to law.

This is

the result of the fundaental principle that the majority
of the stock-holders can regulate and control the lawful
exercise of the powers conferred on a corporation by its
charter."

It

is implied that the majority shall have

supreme authority to direct the policy of the corporation
in attaining its chalered purposes and shall have the

power to appoint the usual managing agents to whom the
tivediate control and direction of the company's business is delegated.

While the general principle is,

as

has been stated, there are are some rights which persons
representing the minority of the stock possess, and of
these I shall treat.

Right to Examine Books.
It was formerly held in England, that stock-holders,
unless in the majority and by an appointed agent, could
not examine the books of the corporation at their own
pleasure.

IEl. and El. 289.

In the United States,

however, the prevailing doctrine appears to be that the
individual share-holders have the same right to examine
the company's books,as the members of an ordinary partner
ship have to the firm books.

The doctrine and reason of

this law is, that the books are the commnon property of
the corporation, though they are necessarily kept by
some one person, or perchance in the possession of the
majority.

105 Penn. St. 111,

116.

In many states statutes have been passed givin, the
share-holder the right, with certain limitations and

restrictions, to inspect the books in a respectable manner, and even to obtain a sworn statement of their condition from the agents of the corporation.
New York,

Act of 1848, Chap. 40, secs. 2:,

ed L. 1854, Chap. 201,
It

and Laws 1862,

Statutes of
27.

Amend-

(hap. 472.

is clearl-T a right of a share-holder to obtain a

rigrht of production of the company's books in a legal
proceeding,,vhenever he can base this right to inspection either upon statutes or established rules of prac-

rice.

His remedy, in case of a refusal , is a mandamus

against the company to allow an inspection.
419.

5 Cowen,

1 Q. B. 282.

Right to Certificates of Stocks.
It is customary to issue to each share-holder of the
corporation, a certificate statinr the number of shares
held by him and anything else that is necessary to indicate his standing as a share-holder in the corporation.

These certificates are treated as representing

the shares themselves, and are issued to enable the share
holder to transfer and negotiate his stock in a free and

unincumbered manner.

If the charter provides that

these certificates shall be issued, or if

it

is custo-

mary and usual that they are issued, the agents of the
company are bound to issue a certificate in the customary

form to each holder of shares upon the company's books.
They have no right to discriminate against particular
share-holders under these circumstances.

I.N. Y. 416.

Right to Transfer and Record.
A transfer of stock at Common Law could not be
enforced in a Law Court, but could be in a Court of
Equity.

The doctrine was in those early times,

that

there was necessarily novation in an operation of this
kind, and that,in order to have novation, there must be
consent, express or implied, on the part of all the
other mriembers.

3 1". and K. 20 ; 10 Hare 163.

Corporations and joint stock companies,

organized

under statutory provisions, are governed by other rules.
It

is implied in the charter +hat the share-holders may

transfer stock at will by simply giving notice to the

company of the trans fer.

Of course,

reasonable rules

regarding the transfer may be made by the managing
agents of the corporation, as to the manner in which
shares may and shall be transferred.

But they cannot

prohibit transfers entirely, and any unreasonable restrictions on the right to transfer will not be allowed.
Thus a majority of the stock-holders of the corporation
cannot, without express provision in the charter, pass
a by-law making the right to transfer shares depend upon
the approval of the board of dir-ectors or any other

agent of the company.

48 Iowa, 339 ; 8 Pick, 90.

The right of a share-holder to transfer his shares
is founded upon the implied tenis of his contract of
memb er sh i p.

It is a legal right based upon contract.

The refusal of the ap:ent of the corporation to transfer

8
the shares does not cancel the shares and put an end to
the contract of membership.

The right of action still

exists and the vendor would have his action against the
company.
It has been held by some courts that mandamus is
the proper remedy to compel the officers of the corporation to make a transfer.

9 Cal.

112 ; 45 Ind. 1 ;

2 South Car. 25; but the weight of authority is the other
way.

l5 Minn. 177 ; 46 Ivo.

243 ; 110 i,,iass.

95.

155 ; 47 Mich. 429 ; 6 Hill

Mandamnus,

being a purely legal

remedy, ou ,,ht not to be granted at the suit of one who
has a mere equitable interest, as the claim of the vendoi, will be in almost all cases.
429.

127 Iviass. 104 ; 47 Mich

Right to Vote and Elections (lenerally.
Since the power to appoint directorswould,

on gen-

eral principles of law, even in the absence of special
regulations,

rest in the members,

and as membership con-

sists principally in the ownership of shares, and the
right to and the ownership of such shares is evidenced
by the certificates of stock prepared and vouched for
by the corporate agent, and as such certificates may be
held by the original owners or transferred by assijnment
to others, it is deduced on a fundamental principle that
holding stock constitutes membership in a corporation
and carries with it

the right to vote.

incident to the relation which the

This right is

corporators bear to

the corporation, and is one of those absolute rights,
to deprive him of which would be a violation of his con-

stitutional ri ,,Jts.

ton, 3)

Ind. 393,

But it

that it

is held in Becket vs. Hous-

is not always necessary or

essential that the owners of stock have a certificate
thereof, to entitle them to vote for directors.
As has been said, the power of electing directors
is lodged in the stock-holders.

If the exercise of

this power is regulated by statute,

the corporation can-

not by its by-laws,

resolutions,or contracts,

or give it

When the statute is silent in this

away.

respect, the election of directors,

either take

like the election or

appointment of subordinate officers, would be subject to
the regulation and control of the corporation ; but, if
the statute expressly declares who shall be entitled to
vote for directors,

its provisions are imperative on the

corporation, forming a part of the law of its being

11

and the corporation has no power to extend or limit the
right as revul tted by statute.
37 Cal.

Brewster vs.

Hartley.

1b.

Under certain circumstances it

seems that a Court

of Equity might enjoin a stock-holder from voting a par-

ticular stock.

But such injunction can only issue when

the complainant can show a plain purpose of parties to
vote the stock, and to vote it

a particular way ; that

the effect of the vote ,,Till be to control the election
that the mischief will result to the corporation, and
that irreparable or permanent mischief will come either
to the corporation itself or to the stockholders.

The

right itself is clear, but the circunstances upon which
the relief will be granted must be very clear.

So, also, where a combination or conspiracy can be

12
shown for the purpose of controllin, an election in
fraud of the rights of those share-holders who are not
in the combination,
344 ; 5 Blatchf,

an injunction will insue .

525.

.5: Barb.

But such an injunction w;ill

prevent the election from taking place.
trary, the election goes on,

and is

not

On the con-

valid even though it

happen that what would have been a minority of the votes,
had not the injunction issued, becomes by reason thereof
a majority and elects.

Ryder vs.

Alton & R. R.

13 Ills.

516.
The general rule, however, unquestionably is,

that

one stock-holder has nothing to do with the vote of
another stock-holder,

and can law'ull;y do nothing to

abridgP[e The rijht of another to vote or to control or
direct the castins,

of th -, vote of any other member of

the corporation .

Alton R. R. Co.

Case,

Supra.

There are various wayrs in which an iflegTal or
fraudulent election of directors or managers of an incorporated company can be investigated, the fraud unearthed ind the ill egality set aside.

In New York, the

Supreme Court sitting as a Court of Chancery is empowered
to review corporate elections,

and to grant relief as the

particular circumstances and justice of the case seem to
re qti re.

Under this power,

granted by statute, an

election may be declared void by reason of the conspiracy, frauds

,

or trickery on the part of the corporators.

Schoharie Valley R. R. Case, 12 Abb. Prac.

(1i.

S.)

394.

In the application of Syracuse etc. R. R. Co. 91 N. Y. I.
Stockholders owning a majority of +he stock have a right
to combine and secure the election of a board of direc-
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tors, provided it

be without fraud in forming the com-

bination; and this is done every day.

But the co.bine

must be without fraud ; otherwise an injunction will lie
in

favor of the minorityT.
At Comnon Law mandamus would lie in

holders who desired an election.

favor of stock-

Under the statutes

of New York the rigrht is given them to compel an el ecrich.

If the directors could keep themselves in office

by not having an annual election, the stock-holders would
be powerless, and the officers once elected might perpetuate themselves in power as long as they chose.

Such

a course would be in direct opTposition to the mandatory
provision, requiring that the trustees, annually elected,
shall manape the affairs of the corporation.

The enac t-

ment prevents any such arbitrary use of power and pro-

tects the stock-holders of corporations from the misconduct of their officers in titis respect.

'I qis is in

entire harmony with the provisions of the 1Janufacturing
Act, and does not in any way conflict with the rirht of
the officers to make reasonable and prudential regulations and unless for the management and disposition of
the stock and business affairs of the company.
vs.

Cumings, 72 N. Y. , 4&3 ; 61 Rarb.,

People

397 ; 10 Nevada

167.

Cook says "The minority in such incorporated bodies
are under an implied obligation to submit to the will
of the majority. "

He is right as far as he goes,

but

he should add, "in cases only where there is neither
conspiracy or fraud'.
At Coimon Law a stock-holder had no rigjht to cast

his vote byr proxi..
however,

The statutes in most of the states,

have regulated the iiatter, so that now a stock-

holder may vote by his attorney or by proxy and,

with the minority, his vote counts.

although

The corporate of-

ficers elected by the majority have no right, neither

can they make any laws or rules chanpging tie statutory
right to vote by proxy, or fix such rules as will impose upon the minority hardships and difficulties.
Members in the minorit7y are entitled to notice of
election, except where the time is fixed by the charter.
Where no sufficient time is fixed by charter or statute
or by-law, each stock-holder is entitled to an express
personal notice of every corporate meeting.
can operate
and it

No usage

to excuse a failure to give such a notice,

has been held that custom or by-laws cannot

change or abroi,ate the right to a notice of corporate
mee tings.

The King vs.

Bird.

13 East, 367.

Right to restrain Ultra Vires Acts.
A sin jle share-holder has

mple power to restrain

a corporation from diverting the corporate funds from
the purposes for which they were ori,1'inally intended,
and ordinarily can prevent any ultra vires act ; provided, alwiays,

that he is not chargeable with acts or

omissions by which his ri.,hts can be held waived or
forfeited.

Thus a share-holder in a railroad corpora-

tion may enjoin the carrying out of an ultra vires lease
of the road.

41 N. J.

Eq. 1,

or the performance of an

illegal contract, 24 Pa. St. 378.

A minority or even

a sinfle share-holder may restrain the corporation or

the corporate management from diverting the corporate

funds to unauthorized purposes.
company,

L-2 11. 1. !T5hus.

Thus a

chartered to manufacture pi, iron, may be en-

joined by one of its stock-holders from erecting a corn
and flour mill.

52 Ga. 276.

Unless the right to alter or repeal is reserved
to the state or some express provision in the original
instr-inent covers the matter, the charter or articles
of association cannot, against the vwill of a sinfle
stock-holder,
ture,
Fl.

be substantially altered by the Legisla-

even with the consent of the majority.
4)5.

24, 11.

J.

This is because of the impliod agreement be-

tween the state and the corporation.

Of course it is

not a c.ontract in the sense that A contracts with B.
On the contrary, in

he charter the state does not pur-

port to contract with the corporation nor the corpora-

tion with the state..

The terms and provisions of the

contract ave rather rules of law which will manifest
;hejiselves in lefal relations betw,;en the corporators
and between them and ofher persons contracting in respect to +,he corporate enterprise.

The agreement on

the part of the state is that it will not
peal these rules of law.

alter or re-

And a share-holder has his

remedy by injunction to restrain the acceptance of any
radical amencdment.

4 Riss. 78 ; 6 Ohio St. 119.

Still the Legislature may confer on the corporation
additional powers tending to facilitate the accomplishjent Of the original purposes of incorporation.
Fq.

10 1. J.

171.

It

is the duty of the corporate manappment to con-

duct the affairs of +,he corporation in the interests of

share-holders as such ; and the management 1:rill not be
justified in promotim outside inte'ests of a majority
of share-holders in disreard to the interests of never
so small a minority.

A court will interfere at the

suit of a minority when the majority seek to appropriate
the assets of the company or to obtain for themselves
advantages not shared by, the minoritr.
2B Blatchf.

:31,

IVlinn 140

517 ; 11 Daly 373.

In the case of Goodin vs. the Cincinnatti etc.

Canal Co. , 18 Ohio St. , 169, Justice Welsh, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said : "To undertake, by
getting control of the company,

and then, under pretense

of acting as agents or trustees for all the stock-hold-

ers, deliberately

to tr.iTple under foot the rights of

the minority is rather a

sharp practice and one which a

Court of Equity will never tolerate. "
share-holders,
holders, may,

minority of

on behalf of themselves and other sharefor conspiracy and fraud or acts ultra

vires whereby their interests have been sacrificed, maintain a bill in equity against the corporation, its offi,:ers and others who have participated in the wrongful
acts.

6 Allen 52.

Ultra Vires Acts in Reference to
Sales, Consolidation, etc.
That a charter constitutes a contract between the
corporation and its stock-holders is a principle of law
that has become firmly imbedded in the jurisprudence of

modern times.
stability,

Upon this principle of law rests the

permanence,

and honesty of managenment of cor-

porations, particularly those of railroads, and from it

arises much of the confidenoe,

safety and protection of

the stock-holder himself.
It was first proiulgated in America in 1820 in
Livingston vs. Lynch, 4 Johns.

373, and was applied
37a.3.

to corporations in the Hartford and New Haven R. R. Co.
vs.

Croswell,

5 Hill 383 (1843).

These cases have been

followed by a long line of supporting decisions.

They

--lere the first to establish clearly that any act or
proposed act of the corporation or of the directors of
a majority of the stock-holders, which is not vithin the
express or implied powers of the charter of incorporation or association,acts,

in other words,

any ultra vires

is a breach of contract between the corporation

and each of its stock-holders, and that consequently
t

a

any one or more of the stock-holders may object
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thereto and compel the corporation to observe the terms
of the contract as set forth in the charter.
The case of Abbot vs.
33 Barb.

b78 (1861)

the Aerican Hard Rubber Co.,

clearly established the principle

in this country that a dissenting stock-holder may prevent the sale by the directors,
stock-holders,

or by a majority of the

of corporate property which is essential

to the continuance of the business of the corporation or

the payment of corporate debts.

And even where a dis-

solution is the purpose in view, if the corporation is a
prosperous one it
sale can be made.

is ex'taemely doubtful whether such
The old Comon Law doctrine, that

a majority of the stock-holders may at any time effect
a voluntary1 dissolution,

is still maintained.

Rut if

the purpose of such dissolution is not the bona fide

discontinuance of such business, but is the continuance
of that business by a new corporation, then the better
and latfer rule is that a dissenting stock-holder may
prevent the sale even though it
dissolving the corporation.

is made with a view of
This is the law laid down

by the well reasoned case of Kean vs. Johnson, 9 N.J.
Fq. 401, the court saying :"

It is not true that a

majority of stock-holders in any corporatinn, however
prosperous their affairs may be,

can at their own mere

caprice, sell out the whole source of their emolunents,

invest their capital in other enterprises and that, however the minority may desire the prosecution of the busin whi ch
inessthey had engaged, they have no injury to complain
of at Law or in equity so lone as they obtain their
portion of the proceeds of the sale.

If such wvere the

law, corporations would soon be few, for seldom would
capitalists, whatever their comparitive wealth, invest
in enterprises so readily rendered profitless at the
caprice or in obedience to the interests of arn,

set of

men or a sinole man rich enourh to con+-'ol a majority
of the stock.'

And even where the majority have a

statutory power to dissolve the corporation at their
pleasure, yet they cannot use that power to defraud the

minority out of the fair valuation of their property.

Wall ace J. saying in the ca se of Ewin vs. the Oregon

Ry & Nay. Co., 27 Fed. Rep., 635, "A dissolution under
such circunstances is an abuse of the powers delegated

to the majority.

It

is no less wrong because accom-

plished by the ag-ency of legal forms.

Such dissolutions are practically frauds on the law

and on dissenting and minority stock-holders.

They

seek to do indirectly what cannot legal]y be done dire ctl y.

If,

however,

the corporation is

able and failing enterprize,

an unprofit-

then a sale of all the cor-

porate property with a view of dissolution may be made by

a majority of the stock-holders.

30 Penn. St. 42.

The

reason for this is that it would be unjust for one menber to hold his fellow members to an investinent that is
unprofitable and impracticable,

and prevent them from

embarkinpr in another that is more remunerative.

If the

sale is made to another corporation, the stock of the
latter cannot be forced upon the dissenting stock-holders.

They are entitled to their money.
These principles of law are important, particularly

when a consolidation of ,orporations

is

attempted by a

dissolution of one of them.

Corporations are form~ed

for the purpose of transacting their own husiness and
not for the purpose of allowin . others to do it
them.

for

Unless the charter expressly confers upon the

company the right to consolidate,
vent such consolidation.

a minority could pre-

Thonas vs. Railroad Co. 101

U. S. 82 ; Tro etc. R. R. Go. vs.
86 N. Y. 117 ; Kean vs.
Clinch vs.

Financial

Co.

Boston & R. R. Co.,

Johnson, 8 1'. J.
L.

R.

; 5 Eq. 4

Eq. 401,
.

By far the greater nunber of cases involvinig acts
which are ultra vires affectinm

the rights of stock-

holders are cases groiving out of attempted consolidation,
absorption, lease or sale of the property of one railroad corporation by or with tiat

co rpot al-io n.

of another railroad

The tendency of railroads in these modern
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times is

towards the consolidation and creation of trunk

lines which serve to annihil ate small er concerns.

The

demands of coiimerce have caused the consolidation and
absorption of smaller corporations by larger, 4,ich -have

given rise to many decisions analyzing the different
a-ansaction incident there',o and adjustinm' the rights of
the parties on equitable principles.

Is it any wonder

that men who have million of dollars involved in a business enterprize, but who nevertheless have no say as
to the manner of its uise,

should cry out to the courts

and Legislatures of the states to help them ?

13ut is

the right of the minority stock-holder to be considered
supreme when the needs of this growing country call for
a consolidation of two vast enterprises in order to
facilitate business, or is he -,o be allowed to clog the
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wheels of comnerce because he has a few paltry dollars
at stake ?

No; he may object for fraud, conspiracy or

trickery, but where the promotion of the interests of
all concerned will be attained, he will either be ob-

ligd to submit or step down and out.

Right to Dividends.
The ultimate object for which every ordinary busis formed
iness corporation~is for the pecuniary profit of its in-

dividual members.

Any net increase of the capital of

an institution of this kind is a gain upon the united
investment of its shiare-holders,

and may be distributed

amongst then as profits, each share-holder beiwg entitled
to his proportionate dividend or share.

Of the differ-

ent kinds of dividends I shall not speak, as the rules
of La- applicable to one are applicable to all.

The power of determining whether a corporation has
earned a surplus which w(*uld warrant the payment of a
dividend is vested in a board of directors.

In exer-

cising this power the directors cannot act arbif,,-arily
they must make an investigat"ion of the affairs of
corporation and must in good faith apply the principies of good business judgment, coupled with fairness,
to the t.'ansaction.

But the directors cannot be held

liable for a mere mistake of jud gment in rna>ing an
erroneous valuation of the corpany's assets.
Case,

Stringers

4 Chan. 475.
Profits earned by a corporation may and should be

distributed Ljion1- its share-holders ; but it
violation of the charter if

is not a

they are allowed to accumnu-

late, and remain invested in the company's business.

The

managin; agents of a corporation are iinpliedly vested
with a discretionary power with regard to the kind and
manner of distributing its profits.
33 Conn. 446 ; Karnes vs.
4 Abb.

Pr.

(N.S.)

Chan. 280, 303.

Pratt vs. Pratt,

Rochester etc.

107 ; Barry vs. h:Ier.

R.

Ex.

R.
Co.

Co.
1 Sandfs.

They may apply the profits to the

payment of a floatim', or funded debt or in the development of the company's business ; but so long as they do
not abuse their discretionary powers or violate the cornpany's charter, the court

cannot interfere.

State vs.

Bank of Louisianna, 6 La. 745 ; Smith vs. Prattville

1ij
f'g Co. , 29 Ala. 503.
But it

is also clear that the agents of a corpora-

tion and even a majority cannot arbitrarily withhold
profits earned by the company or apply them to any use

which is not authorized by the compainy's charter.

Ifra

majority of the share-holders of a corpora tien, or the
directors thereof,

wrongfull. refuse to declare a divi-

and distribute profits earnod by: the company,

dend,

any

share-holder feeling, aprieved may obtain relief in

Equity.

Stevens vs. South Devon Ry Co., 9 Hare 313.

Beers vs. Bridgport Spring Co., 42 Conn. 17; Scott vs.
Eagle Fire Co.,
Ry Co.,

13 Beav.

7 Paige 20.3 ; Browne vs.

I,onmouthshire

32.

In Faucett vs.

Lourie,

I Drew.

& Si. , it

was held

that a declaration of a dividend gives the share-holders
such a legal right to the payment of it

that a Court of

Chancery will not, at the suit of a sirngle share-holder,
interfere by an injunction to restrain the riirectors

from pay ing it.

Suits against corporations to enforce the payment of
dividends cannot be iraintained until a demamd has been
i:iade and payment refused.
etc. R. R. Co.,

6 Gill.

368.

Balt.

'52 Barb. 4 5 ; State vs.

A Court of ChanceryT will

upon the application of any dissenting member,

enjoin an

attempt to distribute any part of the capital stock as
a dividend.
Pr. 277;

Carpenter vs. IT.Y. etc. R. R. Co.,

5 Abb.

Salisbury vs. 1M.ietropo Iitan Ry Co. 38 L. J.

Chan. 249.
In general the declaration of a dividendi rests
entirely with the directors.

The free exercise of

their discretion cannot be interferred with by the contrac t

of the promoters or the original incorporators

as to the disposition of corporate profits.

But when

money which ought to have been divided anongr the stock-

holders has been applied by the (;irpctors to a purpose
not iva Tantkd by and not within the scope of the charter,
there is such a broach of trust as to rive a Court of
Equity jurisdiction.

And obviously whenever there is a

clear abuse of power on the part of the corporation management and a refusal to declare a dividend that ouht to
be declared,

a Court of EqiLty will at the instance of

any share-holder,

provided there is no laches, compel

t ae proper authorities to declare and pay the dividend.
There can be no dispute and it

is a well knovwn fact,

especially anong business men, that those who hold a
minority of the stock of the corporation are often
shaiefully abused and their ripghts disregarded.

They

seldom have any representation on the board of directors
and thus know li tl+e of the inside workings of the man-

aPjement of thie corporation affairs.

The 'e has been a

tendency by the courts in recent times to alleviate this
suffering on the part of the minority and to give them a
recognition, at least, where it has been demanded.
There are unfortunately few,
on this point and it

if any, adjudicated cases

is only from the dicta of judges

that we can see this.
The Legislatures of some of the states have also
seen fit to make some enactments in this direction.
There is now a bill before the Legislature of this state
in which it

is attempted to provide a method by which a

minority may have a representation on the board o.f
dire ctors.

It provides that for a certain number of

directors to be elected, each stock-holder shall vote for
but a limited niiber,

generally one or two more than half

the whole number to be elected.

By this means it

vill

be possible for the minority to obtain reprsentation
where before it was ]Jip)os"ible.
right direction ; and while it

This is a step in the
is not best that the

majority should be subject to all the petty whims of
the minority,

still it

is advisable that they have some

means of knowing what is being done with their investments, and that they should have a representative present
who may object at the proper time to any unrighteous and
malicious action on the part of the majority.
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